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INTRODUCTION
fter September 1 lth, our nation was confronted with the vulnera-
bility of its borders. The United States has responded to the
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon with a "war" on terror-
ism.1 This "war" defies the traditional notions of combat. It is a battle that
requires new tools,2 new legislation,3 and a greater cohesiveness in granting
and sharing access to information among intelligence agencies and our
allies.4
Terrorists have threatened the public health of our nation. We are
engaged in a "war" that tangibly affects the entire population of the United
States. Terrorism instills a common fear into a nation, fear of the ability of
terrorists to effectuate high casualty counts on innocent civilians, and fear
of the terrorists' ability to encumber a nation with grief. A further concern
of the population is the extent to which civil liberties will need to be
encroached upon in order to restore a sense of security to the nation. The
attacks of September 1 lth, coupled with other terroristic threats,5 make it
clear that a major public health crisis6 is potentially looming.
' The United States has not declared war on terrorism or Afghanistan. See infra
notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
2Uniting and Strengthening America byProviding Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct TerrorismAct of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
[hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.) (providing for broad surveillance powers). This Act was the result of
Senate Bill 1510, the Uniting and Strengthening America ("USA") Act, and House
Bill 2975, the Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism ("PATRIOT") Act. The final legislation is less invasive than the
proposals originally submitted by President George W. Bush and Attorney General
John Ashcroft.
3See id.; Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
108, 115 Stat.. 1394 (2001); Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 242 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.); Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
4 See infra Part VI.C.
' These threats encompass bioterrorism, illustrated by the anthrax scare.
6A public health crisis could be determined to exist because of a high casualty
count or an increase in the spread of disease.
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The way to successfully win this "war" and prevent a public health
crisis is to achieve safety, while maintaining the civil liberties that our
nation cherishes. Many questions have been raised concerning how
legislation and actions in response to terrorism encroach upon civil rights.'
The basic question is to what extent are we comfortable giving up our
liberties to defeat terrorism?
Some commentators argue that many basic rights are being overstepped
through the course of the investigation into the acts on September 1 lth.
This is the largest criminal investigation in the government's history,9 with
over twelve hundred people detained, and six hundred currently in
custody.10 Reliable statistics on how many people are being held in relation
See infra notes 8 & 180 and accompanying text.
'See Linda Wertheimer, All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 15,
2001). But see Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, Justice Kept in the Dark,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 2001, at 36, 38 ("lilt is far too soon to declare that the
attorney general is undermining basic freedoms or tearing holes in the Constitu-
tion.").
I The goal of the investigation is to "prosecute people suspected of association
with terrorist groups on whatever charges they could find in order to get them out
of the country or injail." Neil A. Lewis, Detentions AfterAttacks Pass 1,000, U.S.
Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30,2001, at Bl. Contra Preserving Our Freedoms While
Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing: Before the Judiciary Committee of the
United States Senate on DOJ Oversight, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Kate
Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies) ("Many of the recent
actions appear to be aimed not so much at gathering information about Al Qaeda
and its members, but at simply intimidating those who have come to visit do
business, or work and become Americans.").
0 Thomas & Isikoff, supra note 8, at 42 (six hundred detained). I have chosen
to use the number six hundred (600) to identify the detainees curiently in custody,
because it is the last number reported. However, any inaccuracies of the numbers
should be attributed to the refusal of the government to disclose their tally, the
possibility that individuals were being counted twice for both illegal-immigration
status and for committing a state or local crime, and because the task of compiling
the lists of detainees was too labor intensive. Michele Orecklin, Why Hide the
Numbers?, TIME, Dec. 3, 2001, at 61. See also Matthew Purdy, Bush 's NewRules
to Fight Terror Transform the Legal Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at A1
(reporting that the Department of Justice has not provided the number of people
detained); David G. Savage & Eric Lichtblau, Response to Terror: Ashcroft Deals
with Daunting Responsibilities, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, at A10 (reporting one
thousand are detained); Time to RethinkAnti-TerrorMoves, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan.
7, 2002, at 23 (reporting twelve hundred are detained). See Bob Edwards, Profile:
Attorney General John Ashcroft Criticized For His Aggressive Approach to the
Terrorist Investigation, Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 28, 2001)
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to this investigation are not available. After early November, the Depart-
ment of Justice refused to announce the number of people detained in the
course of the investigation.
Detentions have been justified based on people serving as material
witnesses, being suspected of having information relevant to the terrorist
attacks, overstaying visas, and committing minor crimes.' 2 Initially, it was
estimated that only 165 people were detained under the Immigration and
Naturalization Act ("INA"). It has been established that most of the
detainees are Muslims or of Middle Eastern descent. 14 However, few details
about the reasons for those detentions have been released; all matters have
been sealed by a federal judge. "'
This Note examines the constitutionality of detentions in the wake of
September 1 th. Part I presents the background on the detainees associated
with the investigation of the September 1 lth attacks and provides a general
framework for constitutional seizures and the legality of detainment. 6 Part
II addresses the Bail Reform Act, 7 which gives prosecutors the ability to
("[T]he numbers... announced don't include people being held by state and local
officials on non-federal charges.").
The geographical origin of those being detained include Pakistan, Syria, Egypt,
Guyana, Turkey, Bangladesh, Yemen, Algeria, India, Afghanistan, Jordan, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, Morocco, Iraq, Lebanon, Kuwait, Tunisia, Spain, Israel,
and others. KarenBranch-Brioso,AshcrofiReleasesData on Terrorism Detainees,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 28, 2001, at Al.
"Purdy, supra note 10.
1 Savage & Lichtblau, supra note 10. Horror stories are already beginning to
surface regarding treatment of these detainees. Stories of deprivation of showers and
toothbrushes, limited access to attorneys, deprivation of a mattress, a cup, a clock to
indicate when to say Muslimprayers, denial of contact with family, blindfolding and
shackling, isolation cells, verbal attacks, beatings by other inmates, and physical
humiliation and degradation are being shared with the public. Civil freedoms are
subsequentlybeing questioned. Cf Wertheimer, supra note 8 (discussing the story of
Yazeed Al-Salmi, a student in San Diego held as a material witness for nineteen days
because he was the roommate of one ofthe hijackers for six weeks.); WilliamCarlsen,
Rights Violations, Abuses Alleged by Detainees; Beatings, Lack ofLegalRepresenta-
tion Cited, S.F. CHRON., Oct 19,2001, at A12; Richard A. Serrano,AshcroftDenies
Wide Detainee Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Oct 17,2001.
13 Judy Peres, War on Terror the Detained, Ci. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2001, at 8.
14 Id.
15 Bill Miller, U.S. Has Wide Leeway to Detain Material Witnesses, WASH.
POST, Sept. 22, 2001, at A21.
6 See infra Part I.
17 Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999); 18
U.S.C. § 3144 (material witness provision). See infra Part II.
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detain material witnesses; the constitutionality of this portion of the Act has
never been litigated.18 Part II examines the constitutionality of detaining
those immigrants who are only suspected to have information relevant to
the investigations of the September 1 lth tragedy. This loosely defined
category of"suspects" begs a closer look at the need for probable cause and
whether that standard has been met. 9 Part IV probes detainment based on
minor offenses unrelated to terrorism.2° Part V explores the provisions of
the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("USA PATRIOT Act")
passed on October 26, 2001, addressing the detainment period for foreign
nationals.21 Part VI asks whether the threat terrorism poses to our country
is sufficient to justify encroachments upon our civil liberties by reviewing
historical precedent for infringing upon civil liberties during times of war
and considering issues of national security.' This Note concludes that the
reasonableness of a seizure should be considered in light of national
instability and that the current detainments are acceptable based on a
shifting perception and understanding of what is reasonable.'
I. BACKGROUND OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW REGARDING SEIZURE AND PROBABLE CAUSE
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that citizens and non-citizens
cannot be arrested without the establishment of probable cause.24 It states,
in part, that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... "25
To arrest on mere suspicion is a violation of a basic civil liberty.26 The
traditional definition of an arrest is to deprive a person of his liberty by
legal authority.27 In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court clarified this
'
8 See infra notes 71, 77, 85-86 and accompanying text.
'
9 See infra Part M.
21 See infra Part IV.
21 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see infra Part V.
22 See infra Part VI.
23 See Conclusion infra pp. 1124.24 See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26 See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959) (citing James E. Hogan
& Joseph M. Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale andRescue, 47
GEO. L.J. 1, 22 (1958)).21 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 178 (2000).
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description by holding that a seizure limited in its intrusiveness may be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.28 To determine what constitutes
a reasonable seizure, the only necessary test is to "balanc[e] the need to
search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure]
entails."'29 Reasonableness is tested under an objective standard: whether
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search
justify a reasonably cautious man to believe that the action taken was
appropriate.3" "What is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances
surrounding the search or seizure... itself."'" Reasonableness "represents
a necessary accommodation between the individual's right to liberty and
the State's duty to control crime. 32
A "stop" is distinguished from an arrest in Terry v. Ohio33 because of
its minimal intrusion, and the requirement of less evidence than is needed
for an arrest. While a "stop" is a type of seizure,34 the standard of proof
necessary for a stop is reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause.35
In Terry, the officer acted for crime prevention subsequent to his on-the-
spot observations; however, stops may also be used for crime detection.36
For instance, after a crime occurs, police may not have more than a vague
description of the possible perpetrator, thus an officer must be able to
"stop" a suspect and make an inquiry before taking further action.37 In
United States v. Hensley,3" the Court concluded that a Terry stop was
sometimes permissible to further the investigation of a criminal activity.
This occasion of permissibility occurs when the stop is of "a person
suspected of involvement in a past crime," only as to "felonies or crimes
involving a threat to public safety [where] it is in the public interest that the
crime be solved and the suspect detained as promptly as possible."39
2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, at 178.29 Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
30 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; accordUnited States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
554 (1980); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975); Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
31 United States v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (citing
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-42 (1985)).
32 Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112.
33 Terry, 392 U.S. at 1.34 Id. at 16. The Fourth Amendment governs all seizures, even those "seizures
that involve only a briefdetention short of traditional arrest."Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
at 551; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-19.
31 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
36 id.; LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, at 216.
37 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 27, at 216.31 United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).391 Id. at 229.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 901094
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DETAINMENT
It could be argued that the current detainees are being "stopped" for
crime detection; however, this argument is not plausible because the length
of detainment is outside the scope of a stop.4" Since these detainments
qualify as arrests, probable cause must be established by finding that a
crime was committed and that it is probable that the detainee committed
it." Probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.42 The Supreme
Court, in Illinois v. Gates, cited their previous decision in Jaben v. United
States,43 stating that probable cause "requires that enough information be
presented to the Commissioner to enable him to make the judgment that the
charges are not capricious and are sufficiently supported to justify bringing
into play the further steps of the criminal process." In Gerstein v. Pugh,45
the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to restraining liberty for
an extended period.46 With regard to a time limit under which probable
cause may be determined, a "jurisdiction that provides judicial determina-
tions of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter,
comply with... Gerstein,"' provided that the hearing is not unreasonably
delayed.4"
The necessity of probable cause and reasonable detainment is the same
whether applied to detainees or citizens in other criminal cases.49 Detainees
are entitled to "due process, the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures, and the right to a speedy trial, among other rights."5 The
4o See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
41 See LAFAVE Er AL., supra note 27, at 146-47 (West Pub. Co. 1984).42 1Ilinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983).
43 Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965).
4Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 n.6.
4s Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
4Id. at 126.
47 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).8
Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering
additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against
the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake. In evaluating whether the
delay in a particular case is unreasonable, however, courts must allow a
substantial degree of flexibility ...
Id.
49 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (No state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
50 Raju Chebium, Constitution Gives Immigrants Same Rights as Native-Born




Supreme Court ruled a century ago that where there is a possibility of a
prison sentence, illegal aliens must be given the same rights as U.S.
citizens."
The constitutionality of a certain law enforcement practice is decided
by "balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." 2 In this Note,
possible legitimate governmental interests in detentions will be examined
against the background of Fourth Amendment law.
II. THE BAIL REFORM ACT AND MATERIAL WITNESSES
The Bail Reform Act allows material witnesses, those whose testimony
is material in a criminal proceeding, to be detained if the government foresees
flight or a possible threat to the community if the individual is released. 3
Reportedly,just ahandful of those detained since September 1 Ith are material
witnesses.' A material witness is entitled to a hearing but can be held without
bail if considered a flight risk or a danger to society.5" The alien status of
some of the detainees arguably qualifies them as flight risks.5 6 However,
5' Chebium, supra note 50.
52United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,537 (1985) (quoting
United Statesv. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579,588 (1983)); accordDelaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387
U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967). Contra Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149
(1925) ("The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner
which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual
citizens."). See supra note 29 and accompanying text. As recent cases illustrate, the
need to construe reasonableness in light of the circumstances surrounding a
situation, rather than the meaning of reasonable at adoption of the Fourth
Amendment is imperative.
1 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1994). See generally Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § § 3141-
3150 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). A material witness is one who prosecutors believe
has pertinent information and who is wanted for deposition or testimony before the
grand jury. Peres, supra note 13.54 Peres, supra note 13.
55 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3144; e.g., United States v. Seif, No. CR 01-0977-PHX-
PGR, 2001 WL 1415034, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 8, 2001) (Defendant was detained
as a material witness because he was a flight risk.).
56NBCNews: Today (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 16,2001) (interview with
Steve Pomerantz, Former FBI Director and Alan Dershowitz, Harvard Law
Professor).
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questions ofabuse of the material witness provision are bountiful with respect
to the current investigation. 7
A. The Bail Reform Act Generally
The provision in the Bail Reform Acte' addressing material witnesses,
states in relevant part:
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person
is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become
impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial
officer may order the arrest of the person.... 59
The arrest procedure for material witnesses is not used frequently because of
the inherent intrusiveness an arrest and detainment causes in the life of
someone who is not even charged with a crime.' ° This Act "permits prosecu-
tors to bring in some potential suspects and other people of interest without
probable cause that they committed a crime; 6 constituting a stark contrast
to the legal threshold needed to detain those people suspected of criminal
activities. The only necessary showing to detain a material witness is that the
witness has "significant information and is at risk to flee."62 It is also easier
to hold someone as a material witness than under the immigration violations
outlined in USA PATRIOT Act § 411.63
" Many have warned that this statute is "easily misused against people who you
think really did it, but you don't have enough evidence to arrest them, so you hold
them as a material witness." Id.
58 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (release or detention of a material witness).59 Id. The statute further states:
and treat the person in accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of
this title. No material witness may be detained because of inability to
comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can
adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is not
necessary to prevent a failure ofjustice. Release of a material witness may
be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the
witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
60 Miller, supra note 15 (Managing Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas W. Turner
commenting on the use of material witness arrest warrants).61 Id. (emphasis added).
62 Mark Hamblett, Witnesses Challenge Detention, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 18, 2001,
at1.
63 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 411
(2001) (generallyproviding for greater surveillance and security measures to defeat
terrorism); Miller, supra note 15; see infra Part V.
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In United States v. Oliver," the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of whether the government has power under the Bail
Reform Act to issue an arrest warrant for a material witness.65 The defendant
conceded that the court has the power to issue a material witness arrest
warrant, but he argued that in order to satisfy the materiality requirement,
courts should require that a factual basis be set forth rather than relying on the
rules delineated inBacon v. UnitedStates.6 Bacon heldthattwo requirements
must be met: "(1) that the testimony ofaperson is material and (2) that it may
become impracticable to secure his presence by subpoena."'67 The court held
that a statement by a responsible official satisfies the first criterion because
of the importance of secrecy in all aspects of the grand jury's investigation.6"
The Oliver court found that "requiring a materiality representation by a
responsible official oftheUnited StatesAttomey's Office strikes aproper and
adequate balance between protecting the secrecy of the grand jury's
investigation and subjecting an individual to an unjustified arrest."'69
However, Oliver expressed "no view on the propriety of extending this rule
to witnesses material to a trial" because of the possibility that the special
concerns of the grand jury are not present.7" Although the court addressed the
applicability of the Act in these cases, it did not reach the merits of the
constitutionality of the provision and its usage.7' It did, however, call into
64 United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1982).
65Id. at 230-31 (discussing the propriety ofthe requirements for establishing the
materiality of a witness).
6 Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that a material
witnesses arrest and detention (before the Bail Reform Act) must be based on
probable cause).67 Id. at 943.68 Id.; see also Oliver, 683 F.2d at 231.
69 Oliver, 683 F.2d at 231.
70 Id. This representation seems to replace what the Bacon court described as
the need for probable cause for a material witness arrest warrant. See supra notes
66-67 and accompanying text; see generally United States v. Hazelett, 32 F.3d
1313, 1317 (8th Cir. 1994) (The government could have detained a material
witness pursuant to the Bail Reform Act in a trial where the defendant was
convicted for possession of more than five hundred grams of cocaine with intent
to distribute. The court did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the Bail
Reform Act).
7" Oliver, 683 F.2d at 231. The constitutionality of § 3144 of the Bail Reform
Act, the material witness provision, has never been litigated. It is notable that the
constitutionality of the power to arrest a material witness was addressed in Bacon
before the Bail Reform Act; where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
authority was based in Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3149. Bacon, 449
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 901098
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question whether the presence of some material witnesses could be secured
by subpoena, especially ifa non-deportable citizen is being held as a material
witness.
The potential for the extended detention of a material witness seems to
be greatest with relation to a grand jury proceeding because in cases where a
material witness is held pending trial, the deposition of the witness can be
taken upon written motion of the witness and notice to the parties, pursuant
to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as long as "further
detention is not necessary to prevent a failure ofjustice." 2
In UnitedStates v. Salerno,73 the Supreme Court determined that Section
3142(e)74 of the Bail Reform Act, which addresses the hearing held to
determine whether or not the witness should be detained in order to assure his
or her appearance and the safety of the community, is not facially unconstitu-
tional as a violation ofthe Excessive Bail Clause ofthe Eighth Amendment."
However, this case is easily distinguished from the instant situation involving
the current detainees of the terror investigation and Section 3144 of the Bail
Reform Act, which specifically addresses material witnesses and only
references Section 3142.76 In Salerno, the Court did not address the constitu-
F.2d at 937.
7 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1994).
If a witness is detained pursuant to section 3144 of title 18, United States
Code, [Release or detention of a material witness] the court on written
motion of the witness and upon notice to the parties may direct that the
witness' deposition be taken. After the deposition has been subscribed the
court may discharge the witness.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a). This deposition"maybe used as substantive evidence ifthe
witness is unavailable, as unavailability is defined in Rule 804(a) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence... ." Id. at 15(e). However, according to § 3144, a deposition
is only acceptable if "further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of
justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3144. A failure ofjustice is not defined in this section of the
Act, but it is presumed to mean a flight risk or danger to society.
73 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (racketeering case involving
use of material witness).
74 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) states:
If, after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f) [a hearing
will be held to determine whether conditions of section (c) can be filled to
assure the appearance of this person] of this section, the judicial officer
finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person
and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the
person before trial.71 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748.76See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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tionality of extended detainment of material witnesses under the Act or the
constitutionality of detainment under the Fourth Amendment. The Court
specifically established, "[w]e intimate no view on the validity of any aspects
of the Act that are not relevant to the respondents' case."
A court must first look to legislative intent to determine whether a
"restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible punishment or permissible
regulation." '78 The Salerno Court reasoned that the legislative intent of the
Bail Reform Act was to use the detention provisions "not as punishment for
dangerous individuals, but as a potential solution to the pressing societal
problem of crimes committed by persons on release."79 The Court further
specified that "the incidents of detention under the Act are not excessive in
relation to that goal, since the Act carefully limits the circumstances under
which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes" 0 and the
safeguards built in for the arrestee assure entitlement to a prompt hearing, a
maximum length of detention limited by the Speedy Trial Act,8" and housing
apart from convicts.' The narrow list of crimes mentioned in the Bail Reform
Act that require detention hearings include: cases involving crimes of
violence, offenses for which the sentence is life imprisonment or death,
serious drug offenses, or offenses committed by certain repeat offenders.3
However, with the secrecy involved in the investigation and the sealing of
documents, there is no proof that these safeguards are being met." It is
imperative to understand that the Salerno majority does not address those
detained as only material witnesses and not also as prior felons.85 The
constitutionality of the material witness provision, Section 3144, has never
77 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 n.3.78 Id. at 747.
79 Id.80 Id.
118 U.S.C. § 316 1(c)(2) (1994) states that "[u]nless the defendant consents in
writing to the contrary, the trial shall not commence less than thirty days from the
date on which the defendant first appears through counsel or expressly waives
counsel and elects to proceed pro se." There are other rules for trial dates
depending on the specific chargeas was referred to in Salerno. See Salerno, 481
U.S. at 747.
12 See generally Lauren Handel Abrams, Thirteenth AnnualReview of Criminal
Procedure I. Preliminary Proceedings: Bail, 89 GEO L.J. 1324 (2001).
83 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(f) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999).
84 See supra Part VI.C.
85 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 ("Nor is the Act by any means a scattershot attempt
to incapacitate those who are merelysuspectedofthese serious crimes.") (emphasis
added).
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been addressed by the courts, probably because of its use in such limited
circumstances.
Under the Bail Reform Act, various lengths of detainment do not violate
due process.' The Salerno decision overturned the court of appeals' ruling
that the Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial detention that is imposed as a
regulatorymeasure. 7 However, inthe cases where detainments didnot violate
due process, a trial date was set and the length of detainment was justified by
the threat to society because of the propensity for violent acts."
Many detainees are probably being held because the government feels
that they are flight risks due to their illegal immigrant status.89 Recently, the
Third Circuit decided Patel v. Zemski,9' holding that mandatory detention of
aliens "violates their due process rights unless they have been afforded the
opportunity for an individualized hearing at which they can showthat they do
not pose a flight risk or danger to the community."'" This case must be
distinguished from the instant situation by clarifying that the material
witnesses in the current terror investigation may or may not have been
charged with a felony, meaning processed under the Bail Reform Act and
detained because they are flight risks. 2 If a material witness has not been
charged with a felony then it is possible that the individual has not been
afforded a hearing to testify to whether he or she is a flight risk. The Third
Circuit's decision illustrates the necessity for determining flight risk through
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.... ."); Abrams, supra note 82, at 1333
n.982 (up to eighteen months was acceptable on the ground of dangerousness).
87 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748. See also Abrams, supra note 82, at 1333 n.982
(commenting on United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 889 (1st Cir. 1990) and
United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir. 1986)).
" See generally Abrams, supra note 82, at 1333 n.982 (providing examples of
cases where detainment did not violate due process).
89 United States v. Seif, No. CR 01-0977-PHX-PGR, 2001 WL 1415034, at * 1
n. 1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 8,2001) (Although Seifwas not a part of this investigation, this
case is illustrative of the way in which a flight risk is determined.).
90 Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001).
91 Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd CircuitRejectsDetention ofA lien WithoutAssessment
of Flight Risk: Court Doesn't Follow 7th Circuit Decision, THE LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, Dec. 21, 2001, at 3. Contra Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir.
1999) (finding that Congress has "plenary power" over the treatment of aliens, and
since those who face deportation as a result of an aggravated felon will ultimately
be deported, they have no liberty to be free from detention until then).
92 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) (1994 & Supp. V. 1999) (This section only addresses a
person charged with an offense.).
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a hearing rather than solely inferring a risk based on immigration status.93
Furthermore, some of those held as material witnesses are not aliens, thus the
court's assertion in Patel that a hearing determining flight risk prevents a
violation of due process is not applicable to this category of material
witnesses.
Civil liberties advocates argue that the material witness statute was not
designed to be used as preventative detention, allowing people believed to
have a connection to a criminal activity to be detained when there are not
sufficient grounds on which to base probable cause to charge them. 4 A
common fear is of the exploitation of this statute. It is possible that many
detainees have been imprisoned for over four months without the prospect of
a trial in the near future. 5 Four of the jailed material witnesses are suspected
associates of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network. 6 These four detainees
have frustrated FBI and Justice Department investigators with their silence,
to the extent that some believe that "traditional civil liberties may have to be
cast aside if they are to extract information about the September 11 attacks
and terrorist plans."'97 The FBIbelieves that the four suspects are withholding
valuable information. 9 Offers of lighter sentences, financial incentives,jobs,
new identities, and a life in the United States for the suspects and their family
members have not been persuasive.99 These men will be imprisoned until
opting to cooperate with the government by taking one ofthe aforementioned
incentives and providing information through depositions or grand jury
testimony, at trial, or until other interrogation strategies are employed."'0
93 Duffy, supra note 91. A hearing to evaluate flight risk is a fairly small
restrictive means to evaluate flight risk on merits rather than on legal status.
9' Wertheimer, supra note 8 (summarizing comments of Steven Shapiro,
national legal director of the ACLU).
9' Walter Pincus, Silence of 4 Terror Probe Suspects Poses Dilemma, WASH.
POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at A6.
96 These four key suspects are inNew York's Metropolitan Correctional Center
being held for 1) seeking lessons to fly commercialjetliners but not how to take off
or land them; 2) traveling with false passports and box cutters, hair dye, and $5000
in currency on the day of the attacks; and 3) alleged links to al Qaeda. Id.
97Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. The "S" Visa is a possible incentive for alien informants who have
reliable and critical information on terrorist operations. This is a S-6 visa. See INA§ 101(a)(15)(S) (2000); DOJ Orders Incentives, 'Voluntary'Interviews ofAliens
to Obtain Info on Terrorists, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1816 (Dec. 3, 2001).
" Prospects of applying pressure on these suspects include strategies of using
"drugs or pressure tactics, such as those employed occasionally by Israeli
interrogators, to extract information" or "extraditing the suspects to allied countries
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In his dissent in Salerno, Justice Marshall compared the Bail Reform Act
to statutes "consistent with the usages of tyranny and the excesses of what
bitter experience teaches us to call the police state, hav[ing] long been
thought incompatible with the fundamental human rights protected by our
Constitution."'' ° While the detainment provisions ofthe Bail Reform Act can
be justified for a convict or an enemy ally, the seizure of an innocent material
witness, who has not committed a specifically describable crime to which
probable cause can be attached, seems facially unconstitutional with respect
to the Fourth Amendment.
B. Due Process Analysis under the Bail Reform Act
The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments state
that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."'" The material witness provision of the Bail Reform Act
should be questioned for its conformity with these clauses because of the
undefined durations for which innocent witnesses can be held.
Courts have stated in dicta that the narrowness of the material witness
provision, coupled with the government's interest in protecting the commu-
nity, make the Act's pretrial detention provision consistent with the due
process clause.103 However, although the threat to society seems to be
substantial, the indefinite holding time, with unpredictable trial dates, calls
into question whether the material witness provision meets due process in the
instant case. With regard to the current detainees, detention arguably violates
due process because it does not meet the Bail Reform Act's goal, as
where security services sometimes employ threats to family members or resort to
torture." The drawbacks to these tactics are that the information obtained by
inhumane treatment or torture cannot be used in a trial, and interrogators who
implement these tactics are subject to charges of battery. See Pincus, supra note 95,
atA6.
Although it is unlikely that our nation would ever allow torture or beatings,
there is speculation as to whether our nation might reach the point where drugs are
a viable interrogation tool. A former FBI official with a background in
counterterrorismrecently commented on the effectiveness ofa" 'truth serum,' such
as sodium pentothal, 'to try to get critical information when facing disaster, and
beating a guy till he is senseless."' He further commented, "[d]rugs might taint a
prosecution, but it might be worth it." However, there is no guarantee that a "truth
serum" would be effective-it simply disinhibits an individual, but it does not
guaranty truth. Pincus, supra note 95.
101 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
'
02 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV.
"o3See Abrams, supra note 82, at 1324-29.
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delineated in Salerno, to offer a "potential solution to the pressing societal
problem of crimes committed by persons on release."' Many of those being
held have not committed crimes, and some of the crimes justifying detention
are minor charges not typically associated with this form of seizure and not
of the type likely to be repeated on release.' The Bail Reform Act does not
permit the government to seek detention based on the defendant being a
danger to the community unless the crime for which he or she is charged is a
"crime of violence."'' 6
The Salerno Court specifically qualified its decision in dicta, urging
that no view is maintained "as to the point at which detention in a particular
case might become excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive, in
relation to Congress' regulatory goal."'0 7 It seems as though the Court did
not anticipate the prolonged detention of non-criminal or non-violent
witnesses that will most likely be required in the terror investigation. Thus,
without meeting the legislative intent, this restriction on liberty seems to
equate to impermissible punishment.0 8 Further, the indefinite holding time
makes the Act too broad to fit within the so-called "narrow" provision of
Salerno. Perhaps if the statute had an applicable time limit, it would not
violate due process. The lack of a statutory time limit has not been
problematic until the investigation into the events of September 1 1th.0 9
Since the detainment period has no conclusive end, and because there is not
a feasible way to estimate the end to the investigation of September 11 th
events and when a witness' testimony can be adequately secured by
deposition, it is arguable that the material witness provision of the Bail
Reform Act is unconstitutional.10
104 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739.
' See infra Part IV.
106United States v. Seif, No. CR 01-0977-PHX-P6R, 2001 WL 1415034, at * 1
n.1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 8,2001) (crime of violence is defed in 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
107 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4.
10 8 See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. For a true showing of the
unconstitutionality of the statute under the Salerno decision, a challenger must
establish that "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. To use this test as part of the analysis is beyond the
available facts concerning the investigation and all the circumstances currently
warranting detention of material witnesses.
109 This investigation is ongoing and it is impracticable to estimate when
detainees' information will no longer be needed.
110 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. All other detainment periods
on record are regarded as proper.
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The secrecy of this investigation has yielded little information about a
legitimization of detainments, the number of detainees that are being
held,' 1' and whether or not access is being granted to family and counsel.
12
In the cases of the material witnesses who are reportedly linked to the
Osamabin Laden investigation, no reports of material statements have been
released, and all proceedings have been sealed by the federal courts."
13
While the Justice Department has not commented on specific cases, it
claims that every material witness has legal representation as required by
the Act.1" 4 However, we have no systematic check to determine whether the
Act's requirements are being met.
Hm. SUSPICIONS AND SUSPECrS
Detainees are being held on suspicion of a variety of offenses, such as
possessing false documents and being suspected terrorists, known as
"suspects 'of special interest." 115 This category of detainees also includes
those who were never informed of why they were held as suspects.' 16 Under
the Gerstein v. Pugh analysis," 7 the Supreme Court stated that the Fourth
Amendment necessitates a prompt judicial determination of probable cause
before restraining liberty foran extendedperiod." 8 Whether probable cause
exists is to be decided within forty-eight hours of the arrest, as determined
to be a reasonable amount of time by the Court in County of Riverside v.
' See Thomas & Isikoff, supra note 8, at 37 (approximately a dozen are being
held as "material witnesses").2 Wertheimer, supra note 8; see infra note 172 and accompanying text.
13 See Peres, supra note 13; Kelly Thornton, Three Local Men to be Kept in
Jail Indefinitely: Material Witnesses Lose Case in Court, A re Headed to N. Y., THE
SAN DIEGO UNiON-TRm., Sept. 26, 2001, at Al (These men will remain in jail
indefinitely and will remain uncharged of a crime because of suspected ties to
hijackers. Proceedings involving these men have been sealed, including the
imposition of a gag order on attorneys.).
14 Wertheimer, supra note 8; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142, 3144 (1994 & Supp. V
1999); see also In re Class Action Application for Habeas Corpus on Behalf of All
Material Witnesses in the W. Dist. of Tex., 612 F. Supp. 940, 948 (W.D. Tex.
1985) (holding that individuals incarcerated as material witnesses had due process
right to appointment of counsel).
115 Peres, supra note 13; Thomas & Isikoff, supra note 8, at 39; Wertheimer,
supra note 8.
16 Wertheimer, supra note 8.
"
7 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975).
1 8 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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McLaughlin."9 However, it is possible that before the end of this forty-
eight hour period some detainees were turned over to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") and have never been afforded an initial
hearing.120
Foregoing an initial hearing to determine probable cause before a
magistrate clearly violates the Supreme Court's forty-eight hour require-
ment. The time in which the INS can charge a suspected terrorist of a
criminal offense or commence removal proceedings is seven days, 2' a
standard significantly longer than the criminal law's forty-eight hour
requirement. Even if a proceeding ensues, the INS procedures for post-
arrest establishment of probable cause" and other protections differ
significantly from criminal procedures, and thus cannot be substituted to
establish probable cause.2" With fewer protections under the INS law, it is
easier to find cause for detention, thus defeating the protections against
arrest offered by the stringent establishment of probable cause.
Numerous individuals against whom there is no evidence of criminal
activity have been imprisoned. United States citizens were arrested for
having "suspicious passports" and Arabic-sounding names.Y In early
December, Attorney General John Ashcroft asserted that the number of
people being detained amounted to 603 rather than 1200. Of the six
hundred no longer detained, many were released without ever being
"' See generally County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991);
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 126.
120 Peres, supra note 13; see Lara Jakes, Secrecy Shrouds Arrests, TIMES UNION
(Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 14,2001, atAl (Abdallah Yassine was shackled and charged
with violating his immigration visa, and he was not given a hearing before ajudge
to establish probable cause.).
121 See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
12Immigrant Rights Clinic, NYU School of Law, Administrative Comment,
Indefinite Detention Without Probable Cause: A Comment on INS Interim Rule 8,
26 N.Y.U. REv. L. &Soc. CHANGE 397,405 (2001) (Fourth Amendment rights are
safeguarded by requiring the INS to establish probable cause post-arrest if the
seizure was by a warrantless arrest.).
123 See Victoria Cook Capitaine, Note, Life in Prison Without A Trial: The
Indefinite Detention ofImmigrants in the United States, 79 TEx. L. REV. 769, 777
(2001) (differences in proceedings include that an alien has no right to counsel,
there is no requirement of Miranda warnings, hearsay testimony is allowed, a
hearing may proceed in the absence of an alien, and judicial review is limited).
124 Statement of Kate Martin, supra note 9. Father and son were arrested after
returning from a business trip in Mexico. The son was detained for two months
before a federal judge determined that the plastic covering on his passport had split.
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charged with a crime."2 In other cases, those being detained were never
even given knowledge of the probable cause for their arrest. While it is
typical to provide an explanation of probable cause on which an arrest is
based," 6 it is not always required.127 However, failure to articulate grounds
for probable cause to many detainees is suspicious.
A. Detainment of Suspects Must Be Warranted by Probable Cause
Although mere suspicion of a crime may authorize a "stop," the
detainment of an individual for any substantial amount of time is a violation
of the Fourth Amendment if based solely on suspicion. 28
Recent evidence suggests that the FBI is failing to comply with the
requirement of finding probable cause before engaging in an arrest. "The
FBI is providing a form affidavit, which relies primarily on a recitation of
the terrible facts of September 11, instead of containing any facts about the
particular individual evidencing some connection to terrorism.... The
affidavit simply recites that the FBI wishes to make further inquiries."'2 9
This "form affidavit" is not a sufficient basis for probable cause and should
not serve as a substitute for establishing the specific grounds of cause in
each circumstance.
B. Detainment of Suspects Must Be Reasonable
Assuming that in most cases probable cause has been established, the
question then becomes, what is a reasonable length of detainment?
Reasonableness has been described as "a fluid concept that ebbs and flows
according to the circumstances. In other words, the more dangerous the
125 See Thomas & Isikoff, supra note 8, at 37 (young Israelis were held and
subsequently released without ever being charged of a crime).126 See United States v. Ponce Munoz, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1136 (D. Kan.
2001) (stating that officers "accurately explained to the defendant their good faith
basis for finding probable cause to arrest defendant's wife").
127 See Kladis v. Brezek, 823 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
Sixth Amendment right to be informed of cause for arrest is not relevant until the
United States commits to prosecution; under the Fourth Amendment, police are not
required to tell arrestees of the probable cause warranting their arrest). There might
also be other exceptions to disclosure of probable cause contained in FISA, but that
is beyond the scope of this Note.
12 See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text
129 Statement of Kate Martin, supra note 9.
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situation, the more likely a court is to side with the government."' 0 The
President has great power to order extensive searches and seizures in the
name of national security.' In the wake of the September 1 th terrorist
attacks, the public health danger that terrorists pose to our nation and to
innocent civilians calls for a more flowing and open definition of what is
reasonable. Under past definitions of reasonable seizure,'32 the length of
detainment and little showing of cause would not pass muster under the
Fourth Amendment. However, these detentions are arguably reasonable
based on the public health threat posed to the entire population of our
nation and the unprecedented war that was waged against the United States
by the September 1 1th attacks.
IV. MINOR OFFENSES UNRELATED TO TERROR
Probable cause for detainment in cases unrelated to suspicion of
terrorist activity or to arrests based on immigration violations has been
established by minor crimes: credit card fraud, theft, and forging a
landlord's signature to cash rent-subsidy checks.'.
According to the Supreme Court's holding in Whren v. United States,' 4
the establishment of a Fourth Amendment case turns upon a definition of
"reasonableness," requiring a balancing of all relevant factors.3 5 Histori-
cally, the only cases where the balancing test is applied include those
"searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually
harmful to an individual's privacy or even physical interests."'3 6 Here, the
question is whether established cause is outweighed by the invasiveness of
the seizure. It seems that relatively minor violations do not warrant the
prolonged detention that is occurring as a result of the investigation into the
September 11 th attacks.'37 Under traditional circumstances, these seizures
130 John Gibeaut, Winds of Change, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2001, at 34 (citing Robert
N. Davis, University of Mississippi).
131 Id.
13 2 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
133 See Wayne Washington, As Probe Widens, Detainee on Hold, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct 14, 2001, at A3 1; Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 28,
2001) (Profile: Attorney General John Ashcroft criticized for his aggressive
approach to the terrorist investigation).
134 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
3 1Id. at 817-18.
136 Id. at 818.
'37 Cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). In.Atwater, the
plaintiff sued the city under § 1983 when she was arrested and taken to jail for
failing to wear her seat belt, failing to fasten her children in seat belts, driving
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seem unreasonable because the "physical interests" of an individual are
typically afforded careful treatment."' However, after factoring in the
necessity of this investigation and the public health threat to our nation,
extended detention for a minor violation seems reasonable if a showing of
cause for a minor crime can be used to detain those whom the FBI suspects
might have information related to the events.
V. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE USA PATRIOT ACT
There are approximately twenty-six million foreign born residents in the
United States, equatingto approximatelytenpercent ofourpopulation. 39 The
term "immigrants" includes those who are naturalized citizens,14 legal
permanent residents, 141 undocumented aliens, 42 or refugees/asylees. 143 Many
undocumented aliens enter this country as legal aliens and become illegal
because they stay after their visas expire.14 In 2002, there are an estimated
seven to eight million illegal, undocumented aliens in the United States.
1 45
without license, and failing to provide proof of insurance. Justice Souter, writing
for the Court, held that: (1) officer's authority to make warrantless arrest for
misdemeanors was not restricted at common law to cases of "breach of the peace,"
and (2) arrest did not violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.
See supra notes 29-32 (defining reasonable seizure).
'3 Immigrants' Health Care: Coverage and Access, at 6, 10 (The Kaiser
Comm'n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Washington, D.C.) (Aug. 2000).
"4 A naturalized citizen is an alien who has gone through the process of
naturalization to become a U.S. Citizen. This process requires the alien to be in
good moral standing and a permanent resident of the United States for five years,
as well as meet other requirements. Id. at 10.
14 A legal permanent resident is an immigrant who has obtained a green card
and is entitled to remain indefinitely. Id.
142 An undocumented alien is an immigrant who has either entered the United
States or has remained here without the proper documentation and legal immigrant
status. Id.
" A refugee/asylee is an immigrant who flees his or her home country in fear
of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a social organization. Refugee status is obtained while abroad and
asylees are already present in the United States during their application for status.
Id.
I44 Id. at 6 (four in ten immigrants enter as legal aliens and become illegal).
145 Dan Eggen & Cheryl W. Thompson, U.S. Seeks Thousands of Fugitive
Deportees; Middle Eastern Men Are Focus of Search, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2001,
at A1; see Immigrants 'Health Care: Coverage and Access, supra note 140, at 10
(Illegal, undocumented aliens comprised approximately twenty-two percent of the
nation's immigrants in 1998.).
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The USA PATRIOT Act has significant ramifications for those illegal
aliens. 46
A. The USA PATPIOTAct Generally
Apart from offering substantial new powers to enhance domestic
security, use electronic surveillance, initiate counter money-laundering
measures, strengthen criminal laws against terrorism, and remove obstacles
to terrorism investigations generally, the USA PATRIOT Act that Congress
passed on October 26, 2001, specifically affects immigrants with its
redefinition of the length and reasons for which suspected terrorists can be
detained under the INA. 147
Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT Act adds new grounds ofinadmissi-
bility to INA § 212(a)(3), making it less likely for representatives and
supporters of terrorist organizations to be admitted into the United States.
4
Various categories of activity considered to undermine the United States'
initiatives against terrorism are defined. 149 The previous definition of when
an alien was "inadmissible and deportable for engaging in terrorist activity
[included] only when he or she had used explosives or firearms."' 50 The
USA PATRIOT Act broadly expands this definition to include the use of
any "other weapon or dangerous device" with the intent to endanger the
safety of individuals.' Section 411 also redefines "engaging in a terrorist
activity" to mean engagement as an individual, or as a member of an
141 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
147 See id. §§ 411,412; Senate, House Pass Antiterrorism Legislation; Senate
Subcommittee Discuss Improved Technology, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1609,
1610-11 (Oct. 15, 2001) [hereinafter Senate, House Pass Antiterrorism Legisla-
tion].
14s USA PATRIOT Act §§ 411,412.
14 9 See Senate, House Pass Antiterrorism Legislation, supra note 147, at 1610.
Grounds of inadmissibility include being "a representative of a foreign terrorist
organization, as designated by the Secretary of State under section 219, or a
political, social or other similar group" whose actions are determined by the
Secretary of State to undermine the "United States efforts to reduce or eliminate
terrorist activities," and have used any "position of prominence" to undermine the
United States anti-terrorist initiatives. USA PATRIOT Act § 41 l(a).
5OAntiterrorism Legislation Gains Momentum in Both Chambers; Lawmakers
OfferAssorted Stand-Alone Bills, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES, 1591, 1592 (Oct. 8,
2001) [hereinafter Antiterrorism Legislation Gains Momentum].
"I' USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a)(1)(E)(ii).
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organization who commits or intends to commit a terrorist activity that
causes substantial bodily injury or death, prepares or plans a terrorist
activity, gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activities,
solicits funds or people for the activity or organization, or maintains
membership in aterrorist organization. 52 Further, a "terrorist organization"
is redefined as a group designated under the INA or by the Secretary of
State, or a group of two or more who engage in a terrorist activity.'53
Association with a terrorist organization makes one inadmissible to the
United States if the individual has "engage[d] solely, principally, or
incidentally in activities that could endanger the welfare, safety, or security
of the United States.""l
Initially, the INS required that an immigrant be charged "within 24
hours" 55 This requirement was changed by an interim rule initiated by
Attorney General Ashcroft on September 17, 2001,56 to forty-eight hours
except in emergencies or extraordinary circumstances, where an alien can
be detained for any reasonable period of time.' The passage of Section
412 of the USA PATRIOT Act attempts to define reasonable by altering the
detention period from forty-eight hours to seven days so that the INS can
decide whether to bring immigration or criminal charges against the
detainee.'58 If the removal proceeding is not commenced or charges are not
made, then the Attorney General must release the alien.'59 Section 412 also
"5 Id. § 41 l(a)(1)(F); see generally Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961) (holding that knowing membership and active-purposive membership in
organizations criminal activities constitutes a crime, but membership alone is not
a per se violation and enough to warrant a criminal charge). However, the USA
PATRIOT Act appears to be contrary to Supreme Court precedent, saying that
membership is enough for deportation. Unfortunately, further exploration of this
topic is beyond the scope of this Note.
"I USA PATRIOT Act § 41 1(a)(1)(G)(iii).
'
541d. § 411(G)(2).
155 Peres, supra note 13.
156 id.
'57 See generally Administrative Comment, supra note 122, at 399-400. This
section provides that the INS bring the arrestee in front of an examining officer
within forty-eight hours and states that in the event of "an emergency or other
extraordinary circumstance," the INS has "an additional reasonable period oftime"
to examine the arrestee. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2001); see also Peres, supra note 13.
158 John Lancaster, House Passes Sweeping Anti-Terrorism Bill, WASH. POST,
Oct. 24, 2001, at Al; Senate, House Pass Antiterrorism Legislation, supra note
147, at 1610. Senator Russell D. Feingold (D-Wis.) was the only Senate member
to vote against the USA PATRIOT Act. Id. at 1609.
s9 See USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a)(5).
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provides for mandatory detention, allowing enforcement agencies to hold
people on immigration charges for more than a seven-day period once a
deportation proceeding has been initiated. 60
If an alien's removal is "unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future,
[he or she] may be detained for additionalperiods of up to six months only
if the release of the alien will threaten the national security of the United
States or the safety of the community or any person."'' While the Act
appears to state that the longest possible detention is six months, the
express language only requires the Attorney General to review the
certification every six months. The Act also grants the alien the ability to
"request each 6 months in writing that the Attorney General reconsider the
certification and... submit documents or other evidence in support of that
request."' 62 These provisions clearly suggest that aliens maybe detained for
multiple six month periods if removal to another country cannot be
facilitated in the "reasonably foreseeable future" and release after six
months jeopardizes the national security or the safety of a community. 6
While this seems to be consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Zadvydas v. Davis,'6 both the Court's decision and the statute are still
ambiguous as to how long is reasonable to hold aliens in connection with
terrorism or other matters of national security. 65
The fundamental question is when does the detention exceed the
standard of reasonableness? The Act does not provide any definitions of
reasonableness, nor does it place any clear boundaries on what time limit
defines "the reasonably foreseeable future" with regard to removal or on
the length of detention, provided the Attorney General "certif"' an alien for
detention if he is believed to be a risk to the community or is engaged in
any other activity that endangers the national security of the United
States. 66 Although there is a cap of seven days on the initial detainment
period, once detained for a removal proceeding or criminal charges, this
16' See id. § 412.
161 Id. § 412(a)(6) (emphasis added).
162 Id. § 412(a)(7) (emphasis added).
163 See generally id. § 412; Antiterrorism Legislation Gains Momentum, supra
note 150.
6 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001); see also infra note 201 and
accompanying text.
16' See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (suggesting special arguments
might be made for preventive detention with respect to matters of national security
involving terrorism or other special circumstances).
'6 See Senate, House Pass Antiterrorism Legislation, supra note 147, at 1610;
see also USA PATRIOT Act § 412.
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period is ultimately undefined to the extent that the alien cannot be
deported and continues to be "certified" based on reasonable grounds to
believe that the alien endangers national security. 7
These mandatory detainment provisions are only intended to apply to
persons subject to "deportation" on other grounds 6 ' and those who the
Attorney General believes are a threat to national security.'69 However,
minor visa violations that are usually cured by paperwork are now being
prosecuted while aliens are detained. 7 ' There are numerous concerns that
6I See USA PATRIOT Act § 412. This undefined period is much less severe
and more reasonable than the "contentious indefinite detention provisions of the
administration's proposal" that were ultimately compromised out of the bill on
October 3, 2001. Antiterrorism Legislation Gains Momentum, supra note 150, at
1591. "[T]he PATRIOT Act, approved since the terrorist attacks, allows Attorney
General John Aschroft to detain indefinitely foreigners who are certified as
endangering national security. Some detainees may be held even when the
Zadvydas ruling would otherwise have limited their confinement." Tamar Lewin,
Deported Immigrants With Nowhere to Go Wait in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2001, at 5 (emphasis added).
168 Capitol Hill Hearings Highlight Concerns Over Administration's Anti-
terrorism Proposal, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1525, 1526 (2001) [hereinafter
CapitolHillHearings]. Ashcroft's statement was made in response to Sen. Edward
M. Kennedy (D-Mass) who noted that the administration's proposal would "appear
to allow detention of aliens 'on mere suspicion' that they may be engaging in
terrorist activity."
1691d. at 1527 (Assistant Attorney GeneralVietDinh's comments on mandatory
detention). The final Act disregarded the House proposal to require the release of
any alien after six months whose removal to another country could not occur in the
"reasonably foreseeable future" if this release would not jeopardize the safety and
security of the community and nation. This provision was added by Reps. Jackson
Lee and Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.). Senate, House Pass Antiterrorism Legislation,
supra note 147, at 1611. Further, the requirement of mandatory detention of
suspected terrorists and aliens essentially gives the Attorney General "'carte
blanche to keep someone in prison forever."' Capitol Hill Hearings, supra note
168, at 1527 (quoting Rep. Jerold Nadler (D-N.Y.)).
The specification of those subject to deportation on other grounds is a
justification against arguing that the Act allows mere suspicion to justify
detainment rather than probable cause. See Jodi Wilgoren, Swept Up in a Dragnet,
Hundreds Sit in Custody andAsk, 'Why?', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,2001, at B7.
The administration's proposal initially made the certification decisions of the
Attorney General unreviewable; allowing only the detention itself to be reviewable
via a habeas corpus petition. Events ofSept. 11 Spur Revised Custody Procedures,
Altered Legislative Landscape, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1493, 1494 (2001).70Wilgoren, supra note 169.
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those with minor visa violations should not be treated as criminals and
detained with those suspected or wanted for more serious felonies."'
Apart from concerns about the length a person may be detained based
on criminal charges or to effectuate a removal, there are people who have
been held a month without being charged, and in some cases, they have
been held without access to a lawyer." According to the law, defendants
charged with a crime are entitled to an appointed attorney if they cannot
afford to hire their own. 3 The immigration court system does not provide
an appointed attorney; instead, detainees are told that they may hire a
lawyer, but that one is not automatically assigned. 4
The injustice of the events of September 11 th has seemingly given
legislatures the perception that probable cause should be expanded and that
immigration law can substitute for criminal procedure.
B. Redefining Probable Cause and Reasonableness Standards
Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT Act appears to redefine the
elements of probable cause.'75 As is evident in the description of the Act in
Sections 411 and 412, any remote link to a terrorist organization serves as
reasonable grounds for probable cause to justify detention. 176 This means
that a remote link to a terrorist organization, such as giving money to an
organization that unknowingly associates with a terrorist group, constitutes
probable cause. 177 These attenuated links enlarge the definition of probable
cause in relation to terrorist activities. While these measures may be
justified by the nation's desire for the safety of the entire population, they
seem to be beyond the traditional scope of probable cause and beyond the
legislators' abilities to create law. Probable cause cannot be statutorily
redefined. 78
171 See Carlsen, supra note 12.
172 Peres, supra note 13.
13 See supra note 114 and accompanying text
174 United States v. Loaisiga, 104 F.3d484 (1st Cir. 1997); Chebium, supra note
50; Richard Serrano, U.S. Strikes Back; Many Held in Terror Probe Report Rights
Being Abused, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at Al.
'7 Rep. Howard L. Berman (D-Cal.), commented that the "expansive definition
of terrorist crimes was so broad that every act of violence not undertaken for
monetary gain would fall within its ambit." Capitol Hill Hearings, supra note 168,
at 1527.
176 See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
177 See generally Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
178 U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
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VI. A RATIONALE TO JUSTIFY DETENTIONS-
BALANCING HISTORICAL PRECEDENT, CIRCUMSTANCES, NATIONAL
SECuRrrY, CIVIL LIBERTmS, AND SAFETY
The government has fielded many questions about the reasoning behind
its actions. The ultimate rationale for the detainments of a group of people
that once totaled approximately 1200' seems to stem from evaluating
historical uses of power to infringe upon civil liberties and the extreme
measures that are required to assure safety in the wake of September 1 lth
against the purview of Fourth Amendment law. Justification for the
detentions also requires explanation of the secrecy of the investigation and
the necessity to find that protecting the safety of the American population
outweighs encroachments into civil liberties.
A. History of Encroachment on Civil Liberties During Times of War
Do cutbacks on civil liberties during times of war in our nation's
history justify the limitations on civil liberties in the current "war" on
terrorism? 80 Approximately nineteen organizations, including the ACLU,
the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the American Immigration
Lawyers Association, and the First Amendment Foundation do not believe
so. A suit based on the Freedom of Information Act 8 ' has been filed against
the Department of Justice in federal court in Washington, D.C. to follow up
on the request made to the government to release the names and charges
against all those held in connection with the September 11 th investi-
gation.1 82
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the President's extraordi-
nary powers to protect national security, and the current "war" should not
'
79 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
'
8o See generally Thomas & Isikoff, supra note 8, at 38 (discussing Presidents
who have limited civil liberties during times of war).
181 Id.
18 See Marcia Coyle, A 'Less Polarized' Voice in the Civil Rights Debate,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 17, 2001, at A8; All Things Considered: Civil Liberties Groups
Launching Efforts in Reaction to Bush Administration Actions Taken Since
September 11th (NPR radio broadcast Jan. 3,2002). Many individualized suits are
likely to follow. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, No. 01 CV
02500 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 5, 2001); see also Rights Groups Sue DOJ, INS for
Information on Those Detained or Arrested Following September 11, 79
INTERPRETER RELEASES 5 (2002).
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be an exception."' In the American Revolution, Washington established
military tribunals to try enemy spies; many were sentenced to death.1"
Abraham Lincoln, during the Civil War, established military courts to try
those sympathizing with the Confederacy and suspended habeas corpus. 5
During World War II, the U.S. government sent thousands of Japanese-
Americans to internment camps after Pearl Harbor." 6
The expulsion of the entire Japanese-American population from the
West Coast after the attack on Pearl Harbor into "relocation centers" has
been condemned as one of the most tragic events in our nation's history. 7
Two prominent cases stemming from this expulsion are Korematsu v.
United States"'8 and Hirabayashi v. United States."9 This historic event is
not thoroughly discussed in this Note because it is beyond the scope of the
argument. Rather than focusing on racial profiling and the injustice to an
ethnic population, this Note analyses the reasonableness of seizure instead
of the criteria to determine who should be seized because of one's race.
While the internment was an extraordinary use of governmental powers to
facilitate national security, it is exemplary only of the reach of those
powers rather than powers to be imitated.
..
3 See generally Thomas & Isikoff, supra note 8, at 38,42-43. Contra Nicholas
von Hoffman, Defending Freedom By Suspending Liberty, N.Y. OBSERVER, Jan.
7,2002 (asserting that the bombing of the World Trade Center is not a valid reason
to call for the same measures used during the Civil War and in the Japanese
extraction).
"8 Thomas & Isikoff, supra note 8, at 42.
185 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety mayrequire it."); Peter Grier, Fragile Freedoms, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 13,2001, at 1 (Lincoln closed down the newspapers he considered "the founts
of sedition.").
186 See Thomas & Isikoff, supra note 8, at 42-43.
187 JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE INTERNMENT CASES xi
(Peter Irons ed., 1989) [hereinafter JUSTICE DELAYED]. The number in relocation
centers was estimated to be approximately 120,000 people, making these
detainments substantially different than the ones in relation to the September 1 th
investigation. Id.
... Korematsuv. United States, 323 U.S 214 (1944) (upholding the constitution-
ality of the evacuation of Japanese Americans justified by the need for national
security).
189 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (holding that a curfew
applicable to only Japanese Americans was constitutional); see JUSTICE DELAYED,
supra note 187 (reviewing the history and holdings of both of these landmark
cases).
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The question in the instant case is whether the present situation
warrants the detention of hundreds of citizens and aliens, the establishment
of military tribunals, and the expansion of surveillance measures through
the exercise of extraordinary powers, not whether we are engaged in the
prototypical war. The administration has continuously stated that the nation
is "at war.""' The declaration of "war" came on September 1 lth. Accord-
ing to the "law of war," the attacks on September 1lth were acts of war
because they "were carried out against defenseless civilians by terrorists
posing as non-combatants using concealed weapons." '191 However, this
"war" has not been officially declared by the United States.' 92 In fact, two
House resolutions to declare that a state of war exists between the United
States and "any entity determined by the President to have planned, carried
out, or otherwise supported the attacks against the United States on
September 11, 2001" or between the United States and "international
terrorists and their sponsors"' 93 have been proposed. Perhaps the reason war
was not declared is because there is not a clear definition of the parties
against whom we are declaring war. Both bills were referred to the House
Internal Relations Committee, and an "Authorization for Use of Military
Force" was subsequently signed into law on September 18, 2001."4
Congress has not officially declared war since World War II although
administrations still refer to police actions as "wars."' 95
Use of extraordinary power during police actions is consistent with
precedent and is necessary for the well-being of the nation. Whether the
United States is in a declared war does not reduce the severity of the events
of September 1 1th, nor does it reduce the potential for further terrorist
attacks. The nation should not be concerned with whether a technical war
has been declared, but rather it should focus on the need to fight a "war" on
both foreign and home soil with new legislation and investigation
techniques.
190 David Cole, National Security State, NATION, Dec. 17, 2001, at 4.
'9' Joseph I. Lieberman, Opinion: Bad Rap for Tribunals is Unfair, RECORD
(Bergen County, N.J.), Jan. 4, 2002, at 109.
192 See infra and supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
"I H.R.J. Res. 62, 107th Cong. (2001) (declaring a state of war between the
United States and international terrorists and their sponsors); H.R.J. Res. 63,107th
Cong. (2001) (declaring a state of war on "any entity determined by the President
to have planned, carried out, or otherwise supported the attacks against the United
States on September 11, 2001").
194 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
'95 Robert K. Goldman, Certain Legal Questions and Issues Raised by the
September 11th Attacks, 9 HuM. RTS. BmiEF 2 (2001).
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In times of war, it is expected that the government's regulatory interest
in community safety can outweigh individuals' liberties, if appropriate
under the circumstances. The Salerno Court described times of war as
periods when an interest in the well-being of society as a whole is
prominent." 6 The Court cited Moyer v. Peabody,'97 in which due process
claims were rejected when an individual was jailed without probable cause
for over two and a half months in a time of insurrection.19 Justice Holmes
delivered the opinion, stating that "[s]uch arrests are not necessarily for
punishment, but are by way of precaution to prevent the exercise of hostile
power. So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest
belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off... ,199
Detainment seems justified when executed for the legitimate pursuit of the
safety of the nation.
B. Circumstances as Justification for Detainment
Terrorism creates a type of public fear that is not present with other
national threats of security. The Supreme Court distinguished terrorism
cases from cases involving lesser threats in Zadvydas v. Davis."' All of the
justices acknowledged, in dictum, the genuine danger represented by
terrorism or other exceptional circumstances "where special arguments
might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened
deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters
of national security."2 °1 This statement seems to eerily foreshadow the
196 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987).
1' Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1909) (The governor of Colorado
jailed Moyer, the president of the Western Federation of Miners, an organization
that helped to instigate the governor's order for the National Guard to suppress the
insurrection.).
198 See generally Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748. The court also cited Ludecke v.
Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). That precedent, however, depends on a time of
declared war, and thus, is not relevant to this Note.
199 Moyer, 212 U.S. at 84-85.
200 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001) (holding the post-removal
detention statute limits the detention period of an alien to a period reasonably
necessary to facilitate the alien's removal from the United States and forbids
indefinite detention); see also Pincus, supra note 95 (reporting on recent writing
of Kenneth W. Starr, independent counsel during the Clinton administration).2 1 ZadvydaS, 121 S. Ct at 2502; see generally Supreme Court Finds Presump-
tive Six-Month Limit to Post-Removal-Period Detention, 78 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1125 (2001).
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struggle our nation is now facing after the events of September 1 lth, while
also indicating permission from the Supreme Court to utilize detention,
surveillance, and military tribunals inthe current "war" on terror, due to the
suggested "heightened deference" to political branches for national security
matters.
2 02
Former Attorney General Richard L. Thornburgh has said, "[w]e put
emphasis on due process and sometimes it strangles us."2 03 He has
suggested further that the country might have to compare the current search
for information "to brutal tactics in wartime used to gather intelligence
overseas and even by U.S. troops from prisoners during military actions." 2'
The time we are living in calls for a heightened alertness to looming threats
on our nation.20 5 The detention of hundreds of individuals based on the
terror investigation may be justified, in light of the traditional reasonable-
ness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, by the genuine danger to our
nation posed by terrorism, as the Zadvydas Court suggested.2 6
The only existing exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirement
that searches and seizures be based on particularized suspicions involve
"special needs" or administrative purposes.20 7 Without such exceptions, a
search or seizure is unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing.208 In special needs cases, "reasonableness is determined by
'a careful balancing of governmental and private interests,' ... a test [that]
should onlybe applied 'in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable causerequirementimpracticable... ."209 Special needs have been
deemed to include random drug testing, drug testing relating to employ-
ment,210 and administrative searches, such as those of a "closely regulated"
202 See Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2502.
203 Pincus, supra note 95.
2D4 Td
20S See Wertheimer, supra note 8.
206 See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
207 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000).
208 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
209 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct 1281, 1286 n.7 (2001) (quoting
New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)).210 See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (random
drug testing of student athletes); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug tests for U.S. Custom Service employees seeking
transfer to certain positions); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602 (1989) (drug tests for certain employees involved in train accidents or found
to be in violation of particular safety regulations).
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business.. and an administrative inspection to ensure compliance with a
city housing code.212 These inspections must involve a relatively limited
invasion of the citizen's privacy.
Although probable cause is required for arrest, perhaps the severity of
the threat terrorism poses to the United States might also be defined as a
special need after balancing governmental and private interests against each
other. While this proposes a broad expansion of the "special needs"
doctrine, it might be a proper category for the current detainments in order
to prevent a potential public health crisis.
C. National Security-Secrecy, FISA, Exceptions to the Attorney-Client
Privilege, and Military Tribunals
Attorney General John Ashcroft commented that the government's
current actions are "consistent with the framework of the law that we
operate under." 23 However, civil rights advocates contend that the lack of
information begs abuse because "[i]ncommunicado holding of persons in
the U.S. is not a standard way of doing business." '214 Ashcroft's strict orders
for secrecy of the names of those detained, as well as closed hearings, were
rationalized first by focusing on the protection of the detainees, and
secondly by proffering that it would be irresponsible "to advertise to the
other side that we have Al Qaeda membership in custody.""21 While many
are frustrated by the secrecy of the investigation and identification of the
detainees, this is not the first time that our nation has withheld information
to protect national security. When reviewing the satisfaction of the
materiality requirement in the Bail Reform Act, the Seventh Circuit
responded that "[riequiring an articulation of the factual basis for material-
ity could jeopardize the secrecy of the grand jury's activities and precipi-
tate responsive action by individuals who may be connected in some
respect with the matter under investigation." 216 Further, in Kiareldeen v.
211 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-04 (1987).
212 Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967).
213 Peres, supra note 13.
214 Id. (opinion of Ronald Allen, a Northwestern University law professor).
21S Thomas & Isikoff, supra note 8, at 42 (The Justice Department however,
has been reported to have privately acknowledged that the government does not
have any evidence that the immigration detainees are members of al Qaeda.); see
also Shannon McCaffrey, Foreign Diplomats Complain of Secrecy, Cm. TRIB.,
Jan. 1, 2002, at 10 (Diplomats have received little information about immigrants
being detained from Pakistan, notably.).
216 United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir. 1982); see also supra
notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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Ashcroft,217 a Palestinian man was held for nineteen months without bail on
the basis of secret evidence. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the government can pursue a prosecution based on 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(b)(4)(B), which says, "these rights shall not entitle the alien to
examine such national security information as the government may
proffer.""21 The government has the right to withhold information protected
by national security from the alien in a deportation proceeding, and it
should have that same right with regard to the public in criminal cases
where national security is an issue.
Many questions have also been raised concerning the expansion of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA"), 219 the rule fromthe
Department of Justice that authorizes the monitoring of federal detainee
attorney-client communications and the use of military tribunals and secret
evidence. In short, FISA was amended to grant roving surveillance
authority and increases the duration of FISA surveillance.2 0 The interim
rule allows the Bureau of Prisons to monitor attorney-client mail and
communications of detainees and inmates certified by the Attorney General
as being in a category where reasonable suspicion exists to believe that the
individual may use these communications to facilitate acts of violence or
terrorism."' Lastly, the controversial use of military tribunals to try
suspected terrorists may or may not be used to try current detainees.m
217 Kiareldeen v. Ashcrot 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001).
218 Id. at 548-49 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B)); see also Jim Edwards,
Answering Ashcroft's Challenge: Lawyers for 9-11 Detainees Meet to Consider
Coordinated Strategy, 166 N.J. L.J. 961 (2001).
219 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783.
22o USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 §§ 206-07
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see generally Mark G.
Young, Note, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New Regime for Covert
Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017 (2001) (discussing the
constitutionality of surveillance technologies after September 1 1th).
22 The interim rule challengingthe attorney-client privilege is outside the scope
of this Note. For more information, see Controversial DOJ Rule Authorizes
Monitoring of Federal Detainee Attorney-Client Communications, 78 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 1741 (2001).
2See e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that tribunals are valid
venues for non-citizens and citizens if they are suspected of being "unlawful
combatants"); Douglas W. Kmiec, Opinion, Tribunals Don't Coddle Terrorists In
Court, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2002, at M3 (discussing proposed rules for military
tribunals); When to Turn to Tribunals, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2002, at A20
(discussing proposal of H.R. 3468 to authorize the use of military tribunals for
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Although these topics are outside the purview of this Note, they are all
significant uses of power and are meaningful in a full evaluation of the
encroachments on civil liberties made by the detainments in the wake of
September 1 lth.
D. Civil Liberties v. Safety
The state of the current "war" on terrorism calls for the nation to accept
secrecy and question the definition of reasonableness as it relates to
seizures of a group that at one time was estimated to be 1200 people. As a
nation, Americans must balance whether there is an exception for
preventative detainment by questioning whether the nation will be better
served by these encroachments rather than risking further attacks. The
detention of these individuals is substantially more invasive than the
"special needs" and administrative exceptions previously allowed;
however, the magnitude of the potential public health threat is substantial
enough to warrant an exception. These detainments act as a device to
protect the population by detaining those thought to be involved in terrorist
activities or individuals who might have knowledge relevant to the
investigation. Although many detainees have been released, the expansion
of the definition of reasonableness to justify the current detentions has
restored a sense of safety and control to a nation stricken by terror.
It has been said that every democracy confronted with terrorism has
engaged in some sort of administrative detention-Canada, Israel, and
Britain are examples 32 There is much fear of the civil liberty encroach-
ments embedded in the USA PATRIOT Act and other executive decisions
being made in light of the "war" on terrorism. With specific regard to the
detention of 600 to 1200 people, it is imperative that the administration
continuously assure that both justification and a termination point exist for
these detentions.'2 Many believe that the balance is now weighing toward
a breach of civil liberties and that the lack ofjustifications for the detention
of over six hundred is not able to be apprised by the rule of law.n5 Others,
however, argue that this is not administrative detention; instead, many of
crimes related to the terrorist attacks and also to limit jurisdiction to foreign
nationals captured on foreign soil).
22 See generally Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The
Balance Between the Right of a Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of
Human Rights, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FoREIGN AFF. 89,120-44 (2001).
24 NBC News: Today, supra note 56.
= Id.
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those being held have been arrested under legitimate violations0 6 The
proposed justifications for those arrests include the Bail Reform Act's
material witness provision, suspicious conduct, the new powers under the
USA PATRIOT Act, and minor offenses unrelated to terrorism.
Further, the USA PATRIOT Act's expansion of probable cause in the
terrorist investigation may even be supported by Supreme Court dicta. In
Illinois v. Gates, the Court commented that "probable cause is a fluid
concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules." 7 The circumstances of the "war" on terror on both American and
foreign soil justify the extension of this safeguard to allow such a thorough
and widespread investigation.
Many have compared the actions of the United States law enforcement
officers to those of military troops and officers fighting a battle on foreign
soil." Attorneys working on the terror cases have been referred to as "field
commanders in the war on terror" and "lawyer-warriors" who are asked to
follow the paths of their predecessors who fought the "fascists and
communists." 29 The "war" on terror is distinguished from all previous
battles because our nation offers protections to "enemies" or "informants"
to whom this deference would not be given in a military battle.23° The need
to redefine "reasonable" in the wake of September 1 1th urges a reevalua-
tion based on the risks facing the country. Those being detained are being
"reasonably" held in hopes of thwarting a continuing threat.
United States citizens seem to accept these intrusive laws, unconstitu-
tional on their face, as long as there is a relatively smooth period of charge
and release.231 In a Newsweek poll taken just weeks after September 1lth,
eighty-six percent responded that they did not believe that the current
n Id.
27 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,232 (1983).
m See Daniel Klaidman & Michael Isikoff, Holy Warrior in the Hot Seat,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 2001, at 44. Recently, Ashcroft has made comparisons
between the current war on terrorism and the war Attorney General Robert
Kennedy waged against organized crime, noting that mobsters would be "arrested
for spitting on the sidewalk ifit helped the battle." Ashcroft further stated that the
Justice Department will use "the same aggressive arrest and detention tactics in the
war on terror. Our single objective is to prevent terrorist attacks by taking
suspected terrorists off the street." Wage War on Terror, Not on Civil Rights,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 28, 2001, at B3.
22' Klaidman & Isikoff, supra note 228, at 44.
230 See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Wage War on Terror, Not on Civil Rights, supra note 228.
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Although reasons for detainment raise constitutional questions, these
detainments must be upheld and supported by our nation as an effort to
defeat terrorism and prevent a major public health crisis, despite the
perceived lack of constitutionality of the laws and acts under our current
definitions of reasonableness. The boundaries of probable cause and
reasonableness must not be rigidly set. Instead, they must be adapted to
circumstances facing our nation. While civil libertarians question the
validity of the detainments and question the need for such emphatic
secrecy, the nation must stand behind our law enforcement agencies and
trust that their actions will maintain the best interests of the nation.
The detainments resulting from the investigation into the events of
September 1 lth should not be perceived by the public as unreasonable or
unconstitutional seizures. 3 The tragedy of that day has forced citizens of
the United States to redefine our patriotism, to question the vulnerability
of our nation's borders, and to be willing to allow a slight encroachment
into individual civil liberties so that America may be free from terror. The
security of the United States has been penetrated by terrorists and the
government must have power under the Constitution to take all measures
to restore a sense of security to the population of the United States. Our
current definition of reasonableness does not include the length and types
of detentions resulting from the investigation into the attacks of September
11 th; it is the current lawmakers' and judiciary's responsibility to redefine
what is reasonable. Although these seizures are unconstitutional under
traditional notions of reasonableness, such detainments are imperative in
the wake of the vulnerable and shifting state of the nation.
232Thomas & Isikoff, supra note 8, at 38. See also Richard L. Berke & Janet
Elder, Poll Finds Support for War and Fear on Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
2001, at Al (On September 25, eight in ten Americans said they "will have to
forfeit some of their personal freedoms to make the country safer.").
33 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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